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PROFESSIONAL LICENSES AS MARITAL PROPERTY:
RESPONSES TO SOME OF O'BRIEN'S
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
In O'Brien v. O'Brient the New York Court of Appeals deter-
mined that a spouse's professional license constituted marital prop-
erty subject to equitable distribution 2 under New York's Equitable
Distribution Law.3 The O'Brien decision makes New York the only
jurisdiction where courts consider such a license marital property.4
The O'Brien decision will greatly reduce the unfairness resulting
from the so-called "medical student syndrome," where one spouse,
typically the wife,5 supports the family during the other's profes-
sional education, only to be divorced shortly after the professionally
educated spouse obtains a license to practice. 6 Divorce usually
leaves the supporting spouse in a much worse economic position
than the educated spouse because, after having expended most of
their earnings on the professional education, the couple typically
has few marital assets to divide at divorce. The supporting spouse
may not receive an adequate maintenance award to compensate the
spouse for efforts made toward acquisition of the license. 7 The edu-
cated spouse meanwhile looks forward to a potentially lucrative ca-
reer." Although the court correctly concluded that a medical license
is marital property according to the factors listed in New York Do-
mestic Relations Law section 236(B)(5)(d), 9 serious problems may
1 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
2 Id. at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
3 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B) (McKinney 1986).
4 See Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 244-45, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949 (1987) (New
York only jurisdiction where professional license considered marital property).
5 See Note, The Equity/Property Dilemma: Analyzing the Working Spouse's Contributions to
the Other's Educational Degree at Divorce, 23 Hous. L. REV. 991, 993 n.1 1 (1986) (authored
by W. Bruce Stanfill) (in 68 of 70 cases litigated as of Feb. 1, 1986, husband earned
license or degree.).
6 Scholars have long recognized this occurrence and most advocate some type of
compensation for the supporting spouse. See sources cited infra note 25. This "syn-
drome" is no longer "limited to medical students and their wives; the contagion has
spread to college and professional degrees generally." Foster, Equitable Distribution of
Professional Degrees, Licenses and Goodwill in CONTEMPORARY MATRIMONIAL LAW ISSUES: A
GUIDE TO DIVORCE ECONOMICS AND PRACTICE 226, 227 (H. Foster & R. Brown eds.
1985). In addition, the problem seems quite common. In a survey of divorce cases in
California, one in six husbands obtained some education while married. L. WETZMAN,
THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 124 (1985). For an excellent description of "the syndrome,"
see Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 173-74, 677 P.2d 152, 155 (1984).
7 See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
8 See Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 173-74, 677 P.2d at 155.
9 The law states in relevant part:
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arise in applying the court's decision.
Section I of this Note describes the controversy regarding the
classification of professional licenses as marital property. Section II
discusses the O'Brien decision. Section III assesses the validity and
scope of O'Brien. Finally, Section IV proposes changes in the
method of valuing the license in New York to make the property
distribution more equitable.
I
THE LICENSE-AS-PROPERTY CONTROVERSY
A. The Professional License as Marital Property
Most courts recognize that the supporting spouse suffers ineq-
uity when a marriage ends shortly after the other spouse has com-
pleted a professional education. Nevertheless, these courts refuse
to classify the educated spouse's degree or license as marital
property.10
In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c,
the court shall consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and
at the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital resi-
dence and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the
marriage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution
made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having
title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and serv-
ices as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career
or career potential of the other party... ;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or
any interest in a business, corporation or profession and the economic
desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any
claim or interference by the other party;
(10) the tax consequences to each party;
(11) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse;
(12) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimo-
nial action without fair consideration;
(13) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d) (McKinney 1986). The legislature added factors
(10), (11), and (12) after the Court of Appeals decided O'Brien. Act of Aug. 2, 1986, ch.
884, § 3, 1986 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2172, 2173 (McKinney).
10 See, e.g., Jones v.Jones, 454 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (court "not
prepared to hold law degree is marital property"); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo.
429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 76 (1978) (educational degree not "property" within the mean-
ing of statute); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 805-06 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983) (dental
degree not marital asset under Delaware alimony statute); Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So.
2d 146, 148-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (educational degree not marital property be-
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Courts typically base this refusal on one of the following rea-
sons: 1) a license is not property in the traditional sense and repre-
sents nothing more than a personal achievement;"' 2) a marriage is
not a commercial enterprise in which parties expect to have their
accounts settled at divorce; 12 3) the value of a license is too specula-
tive for courts to determine accurately the amount the supporting
spouse should receive; 13 4) future earnings after divorce are not
marital property;' 4 and 5) a fixed award of expected future earnings
cause its value is too speculative to calculate and because future earnings are not marital
property); Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982) (dentistry degree not property);
Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 358, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079-80 (1985) (neither profes-
sional degree nor license is marital property under statute); Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass.
240, 246, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949 (1987) (same); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 496-
97, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (1982) (value of professional degree is only possibility of en-
hanced earnings and thus not marital property under statute); Stevens v. Stevens, 23
Ohio St. 3d 115, 117-20, 492 N.E.2d 131, 133-35 (1986) (degree and enhanced value of
future earnings not property because not assignable; value of degree or license not sub-
ject to precise valuation); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979) (profes-
sional degree not property; supporting spouse entitled only to restitution based on
unjust enrichment); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke, 339 Pa. Super. 559, 563-66, 489 A.2d 782,
784-86 (1985) (degree not marital property); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 658-
59 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (professional education not marital property and not divisible
upon divorce); Grosskopfv. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984) (college degree
not property but permissible to account for increased earnings when determining sup-
port); see also Ruben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 361, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (1983) (Ph.D.
intellectual achievement, not marital property); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14, 15,
498 P.2d 1357, 1358 (1972) (medical license not marital property because not subject to
joint ownership); Helm v. Helm, 289 S.C. 169, 171, 345 S.E.2d 720, 721 (1986) (profes-
sional degree and license not marital property). For a more extensive list of cases, see
Archer, 303 Md. at 352 n.1, 493 A.2d at 1077 n.1.
11 See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (professional degree or license lacks
the essential characteristic of property-alienability). Some legal scholars claim this
view of "property" is incorrect. They assert that alienability is not necessary to describe
something as "property." The Restatement of Property describes "property" as "legal
relations between persons with respect to a thing." 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY
ch. 1 introductory note, at 3 (1936). The "thing" can be intangible and need not have
an exchange value. For an in-depth analysis of this argument, see Note, Equitable Distri-
bution of Degrees and Licenses: Two Theories Toward Compensating Spousal Contributions, 49
BROOKLYN L. REV. 301, 309-15 (1983) (authored by Robert Shuman).
12 See, e.g., Mahoney, 91 NJ. at 500, 453 A.2d at 533 ("Marriage is not a business
arrangement in which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be
settled upon divorce.").
13 See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969)
("At best, education is an intangible property right, the value of which, because of its
character, cannot have a monetary value placed upon it for division between spouses.").
California has since enacted a statute granting the supporting spouse reimbursement for
costs incurred in financing the educated spouse's profession. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4800.3 (West Supp. 1987).
14 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668
(1979) (earnings attributable to law degree, acquired after divorce are by definition ac-
quiring spouse's separate property); Frausto, 611 S.W.2d at 656 (property division pay-
ments made in future must refer only to property acquired during marriage, not
earnings after divorce).
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unduly restricts the licensed spouse's career decisions. 15
Some courts attempt to cure the inequity of the situation by
considering the professional spouse's potential earnings when mak-
ing alimony and maintenance awards1 6 and when dividing marital
assets. 17 Other courts allow reimbursement of the supporting
spouse's direct financial costs in financing the other spouse's educa-
tion.' 8 The award fashioned often depends upon the facts of the
case and the state's divorce statute. 19
Although courts may attempt to compensate the supporting
spouse by considering the value of the license when dividing marital
assets, such an approach provides inadequate compensation when
the couple has few other marital assets. Different problems arise
when courts compensate the supporting spouse with alimony or
maintenance awards. First, these awards often terminate upon re-
marriage of the supporting spouse.20 Second, a supporting spouse
who is self-supporting may not receive a maintenance award that
would compensate the spouse for his or her efforts because such
15 See, e.g., DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 58, 296 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1980)
(spouse may not earn as much as expected or "may practice in a specialty, location or
manner which generates less than the average income" and, "[u]nlike an award of ali-
mony, which can be adjusted after divorce to reflect unanticipated changes in the parties
circumstances, a property division may not").
16 See, e.g., Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 359, 493 A.2d 1074, 1080 (1985) (chan-
cellor empowered by statute to consider husband's earning capacity in making alimony
award).
17 See, e.g., Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (trial
court has discretion to consider potential future earnings when dividing estate). See gen-
erally Hughes v. Hughes, 438 So. 2d 146, 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("[T]he trial
court should consider the husband's education in arriving at the distribution of other
assets and in determining the propriety and/or amount of alimony."); In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 433, 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (trial court can consider one
spouse's contribution to other's education when determining maintenance and dividing
martial property).
18 See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 357, 661 P.2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982) (supporting spouse entitled to restitution of her contributions to husband's living
expenses and direct educational expenses); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J. 488, 501, 453
A.2d 527, 538 (1982) (same); Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250 (S.D. 1984)
(same). Some states have passed legislation granting the supporting spouse reimburse-
ment or restitution for direct expenditures toward the other's education.. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4800.3 (West Supp. 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-11d (Burns Supp.
1986). For an extensive study of why courts refuse to hold that professional licenses are
marital property, see Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Martial Asset Upon
Divorce, 15 AKRON L. REV. 543, 545-53 (1982).
19 See, e.g., R.uben v. Ruben, 123 N.H. 358, 461 A.2d 733 (1983) (spouse made only
minimal contribution toward husband's efforts to obtain Ph.D. and not entitled to share
of rewards); Drapek v. Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 248, 503 N.E.2d 946, 949 (1987) (unlike
New York, Massachusetts's divorce statute does not mandate considering license as mar-
ital property).
20 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(6)(c) (McKinney 1986). See generally Moore, supra
note 18, at 552.
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awards may be based on need.2' In either case, even when courts
include the value of a professional license in making a maintenance
award, the licensed spouse receives increased income for life, while
the supporting spouse may receive little in return for financing the
other spouse's professional education.22
Some courts, however, have held that professional licenses and
graduate degrees constitute marital property.23 These courts mainly
try to reverse the unfairness that results when the supporting spouse
receives little for expended efforts on behalf of the licensed spouse.
For example, a Michigan appellate court that held that a husband's
law degree was marital property noted that the supporting spouse
would not have received proper compensation for her contributions
to the "concerted family efforts." Few other family assets subject
to distribution existed and the supporting spouse could not receive
adequate maintenance under Michigan law. 24
Most legal scholars who have addressed the issue agree that
supporting spouses should receive compensation for their efforts.2 5
21 See, e.g., Woodworth v. Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. 258, 260, 337 N.W.2d 332,
336-37 (1983) (considerations for determining alimony are different than those for di-
viding property; self-supporting spouse may not be entitled to maintenance because
maintenance is "basically for ... support"); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 308(a)
(as amended 1973); Krauskopf, Property Distribution Principles in 3 FAMILY LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 37.06[3], at 37-70 (A. Rutkin ed. 1985). See also infra note 93 for a discussion of
New York's maintenance provision. Some states, however, are more liberal in granting
alimony awards. See, e.g., Zahler v. Zahler, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 2694, 2695 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1982) (court's $42,000 lump-sum alimony award to supporting spouse sub-
ject to increase if licensed spouse earned drastically more than projected).
22 See supra note 6 and accompanying text for a description of the "medical student
syndrome."
23 There are few such decisions, and courts generally have not followed them. See,
e.g., Reen v. Reen, 8 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1053 (Mass. P. and Fam. Ct. 1981) (orthodon-
tist's license marital property; wife's sacrifices entitled her to share in value of license;
Reen no longer good law in light of Drapek, 399 Mass. 240, 503 N.E.2d 946); Woodworth,
126 Mich. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983) (holding that husband's law degree was
marital asset later rejected by Olah v. Olah, 135 Mich. App. 404, 410-11, 354 N.W.2d
359, 361-62 (1984)).
24 Woodworth, 126 Mich. App. at 260-61, 337 N.W.2d at 334.
25 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick & Doucette, Can the Economic Value of an Education Really be
Measured? A Guide for Marital Property Distribution, 21 J. FAM. L. 511 (1983) (proposing
methods of valuing any given level of education); Herring, Divisibility of Advanced Degrees
in North Carolina: An Examination and Proposal, 15 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 15 (1984) (authored
by Judy Rush) (suggesting amendment of equitable distribution act to allow money
judgment for supporting spouse not limited to existing property); Krauskopf, Recompense
for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28
U. KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980) (courts should prevent unjust enrichment by allowing sup-
porting spouse to realize return on human capital); Moore, supra note 18, at 543, 555
(proposing reimbursement award); Mullenix, The Valuation of an Education at Divorce, 16
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 227, 274-83 (1983) (labor theory of value analysis, concluding that
supporting spouse entitled to one-half value of degree); Comment, The Interest of the Com-
munity in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590, 602-12 (1974) (authored by
Thomas Schaefer); Note, Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: A Proposal for Ex-
1987] 137
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The reasons that a supporting spouse should receive compensation
include her reasonable expectation of benefit from the degree or
license; the sacrifices incurred in support of the educated spouse;
and that the educated spouse will receive most of the benefits from
the professional license or degree despite the supporting spouse's
sacrifices. 26 Some scholars also suggest that the contributing
spouse has made an investment in "human capital" 27 by helping the
educated spouse obtain a license or degree, and that the contribut-
ing spouse deserves a return on that investment.
Although scholars agree that the supporting spouse deserves
compensation for contributions to the other spouse's professional
education, they do not agree on the method courts should use to
evaluate the appropriate level of that compensation. Scholars and
judges have suggested four methods to evaluate the supporting
spouse's interest in a professional license or degree: reimburse-
ment, opportunity cost, present value of future increased earnings,
and the labor theory of value.28
The reimbursement method compensates the supporting
spouse for monetary contributions made to the educated spouse's
education. 29 The reimbursement method avoids the possible un-
fairness to the educated spouse of an award based on projected fu-
ture earnings that may never occur.30
The opportunity cost method, in addition to providing reim-
cluding Educational Degrees and Professional Licenses from the Marital Estate, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1327, 1346-52 (1983) (authored by Ann Weiss) (suggesting courts can achieve eq-
uity using existing alimony and maintenance framework); Note, The Equity/Property Di-
lemma: Analyzing the Working Spouse's Contributions to the Other's Educational Degree at Divorce,
23 Hous. L. REV. 991, 1019-37 (1985) (proposing equitable partnership view of educa-
tional degree); Recent Development, Divorce-The Effect of a Spouse's Professional Degree on
a Division of Marital Property and Award of Alimony, Hubbard v. Hubbard, 15 Tulsa L.J.
378, 389 (1980) (authored by Deborah Gronet) (suggesting that courts treat increased
earning capacity as property, and dividing it proportionally according to spouses invest-
ment); Note, The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Other's Professional Degree Upon Divorce,'35
U. FLA. L. REV. 130, 148-52 (1983) (authored by Judy Rush) (suggesting courts consider
professional degree in award to supporting spouse, based either on statute or court's
inherent equitable powers); Note, Family Law: Professional Degrees in 1986-Family Sacrifce
Equals Family Asset, 25 WASHBURN LJ. 276, 301-02 (1986) (suggesting that degree is
property and supporting spouse should receive one-half of income from degree for
same number of years as was necessary to earn degree).
26 See generally Krauskopf, supra note 21, § 37.06(2)(a), at 37-61 to -62.
27 See, e.g., Krauskopf, supra note 25, at 381-82; Mullenix, supra note 25, at 273-74;
Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV.
439 (1987).
28 For a discussion of all of these methods, see Krauskopf, supra note 21, § 37-
06(4), at 37-75 to -80; Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 211-14, 343 N.W.2d 796,
802-03 (1984).
29 Moore, supra note 18, at 544.
30 For discussion of the reimbursement method, see Herring, supra note 25, at 15;
Moore, supra note 18, at 555. See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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bursement for cost incurred, compensates the supporting spouse
for opportunities that were sacrificed in order to permit the profes-
sionally educated spouse to attend school. These opportunities
might include earnings foregone by the educated spouse as well as
educational and employment opportunities foregone by the sup-
porting spouse.31
Under the present - value - of- future - increased - earnings ap-
proach, courts must project the increased earnings the educated
spouse will receive over his lifetime as a result of the professional
license. The court then awards the supporting spouse an equitable
share of this projected amount, which depends on the spouse's con-
tributions to the educated spouse's training.32 This theory deter-
mines the actual economic value of the license to its holder and
awards the supporting spouse a fair share,33 rather than merely re-
turning the supporting spouse's investment in the educated
spouse's degree, as under the reimbursement and opportunity cost
methods.
Under the labor-theory-of-value method, the supporting
spouse receives one-half of the professionally educated spouse's
earnings for as many years as he or she supported the educated
spouse.3 4 This method attempts to achieve simplicity and fairness
by granting the supporting spouse half of the licensed spouse's in-
come as it is earned, thereby eschewing complex formulae and at
the same time returning the supporting spouse's investment.3 5
The controversy over whether a professional license constitutes
marital property and, if so, how to value it set the stage for the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in O'Brien. By granting the sup-
porting spouse a share of the enhanced future earnings of the li-
censed spouse, the court expanded the compensation rights of
supporting spouses in divorce proceedings.
31 For authors advocating the opportunity cost approach, see Comment, supra note
25, at 603-04 (advocating opportunity cost along with valuing potential income capacity
as alternative valuation methods); Note, Horstmann v. Horstmann: Present Right to Prac-
tice a Profession as Marital Property, 56 DEN. L.J. 677, 689-90 (1979) (authored by Amy
Loper) (awards based on opportunity cost compensate supporting spouse without un-
due guesswork about either professional spouse's future income or supporting spouse's
lost income).
32 See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1985). See also Fitzpatrick & Doucette, supra note 25; at 514-23; Krauskopf, supra note
25, at 382-84. The spouse would receive half of these increased earnings if this method
were applied in a community property state. For a general discussion of the community
property approach, see W. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES (1982). This Note only discusses the professional-license-as-marital-property is-
sue in the context of equitable distribution.
33 See infra text accompanying note 129.
34 See, Mullenix, supra note 25, at 279.
35 Id. at 280.
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B. The Professional License as Marital Property in New York
Prior to O'Brien
The New York Court of Appeals decided O'Brien under section
236(B) of New York's Equitable Distribution Law.36 This statute
has two purposes: 1) to eliminate all unconstitutional distinctions37
in New York's divorce statute; and 2) to ensure that all assets ac-
quired during marriage are divided equitably, without regard to ti-
tle.38  The legislation's proponents believed that property
accumulated during the marriage "should be distributed in a man-
ner which reflects the individual needs and circumstances of the par-
ties regardless of the name in which such property is held." 39 The
law reflects the belief that a marriage, at least in part, represents an
economic partnership. 40 The Equitable Distribution Law attempts
to distribute all marital property fairly without regard to fault.4'
New York employs a three-step process, 42 for distributing mari-
tal property upon divorce. This process requires that a court:
1) determine what is marital property and what is separate prop-
erty;43 2) value the marital property and the separate property, if it
has appreciated in value during the marriage because of the efforts
36 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B) (McKinney 1986). At the time of its enactment,
Governor Carey described section 236(B) as "the most sweeping reform of the divorce
laws in [New York] State since the Divorce Reform Act of 1966." Governor's Memoran-
dum of June 19, 1980, reprinted in 1980 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1863 (McKinney) [hereinafter
Governor's Memorandum]. For a general discussion of section 236, see A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE NEW YORK EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION DIVORCE Law (H. Foster, Jr. ed.
1980); DiLeo & Model, A Survey of the Law of Property Distribution Upon Divorce in the Tristate
Area, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219 (1982); Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1981); Note, New York's Equitable Distribution Law: A Sweeping Re-
form, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 67 (1980) (authored by Brian Diamond & William Prinsell);
Recent Development, Equitable Distribution in New York, 45 ALB. L. REV. 483 (1981).
37 The Supreme Court held that gender-based alimony statutes violate the four-
teenth amendment's equal protection clause in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
38 See Memorandum of Assemblyman Gordon W. Burrows, 1980 N.Y. STATE LEGIS.
ANN. 129 (N.Y. Legis. Serv.)[hereinafter Burrows's Memorandum]; see also Governor's
Memorandum, supra note 36, at 1863.
39 Governor's Memorandum, supra note 36, at 1863.
40 Id.
41 See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 589-90, 489 N.E.2d at 719, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 750
("[e]xcept in egregious cases which shock the conscience of the court, however, [fault] is
not a 'just and proper' factor for consideration in the equitable distribution of marital
property") (citations omitted).
42 H. FOSTER, JR., D. FREED &J. BRANDES, 3 LAW AND THE FAMILY, NEW YORK § 1. 1,
at 2 (2d ed. 1986).
43 N.Y. DoM. REL. Law § 236(B)(5)(b) (McKinney 1986). Separate property is
mainly property acquired before marriage and is not subject to equitable distribution if
it has not appreciated in value during the marriage. For a discussion of when apprecia-
tion in value of separate property is subject to equitable distribution, see Price v. Price,
69 N.Y.2d 8, 503 N.E.2d 684, 511 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1986). Separate property also includes
inheritances, gifts from someone other than the spouse, compensation for personal inju-
ries, property exchanged for separate property, increases in the value of separate prop-
140 [Vol. 73:133
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of either of the spouses; and 3) determine what proportion of the
marital property each spouse should receive. 44 To facilitate this dis-
tribution system, section 236(B) enumerates factors that a court
must consider in distributing marital property45 and in making
maintenance awards. 46 The section also provides for "distributive
awards" when it is impractical or burdensome to divide marital
property, or when it is contrary to law to divide an interest in a busi-
ness, corporation, or profession.4 7 This system provides flexibility
by allowing judges to exercise discretion in distributing marital
property to achieve fair results. 48
Prior to O'Brien, New York appellate courts regarded neither
professional licenses nor educational degrees as marital property.49
erty (except for increases due in part to the effort of the other spouse), and property that
the parties agreed is separate property. Id. § 236(B)(1)(d).
44 See id. §§ 236(B)(5)(c)-(d) (court must consider each spouse's property at begin-
ning and end of marriage when distributing such property).
45 Id. § 236(B)(5)(d).
46 Id. § 236(B)(6)(a). The court must consider:
(1) the income and property of the respective parties including marital
property distributed pursuant to subdivision five of this part;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the present and future earning capacity of both parties;
(4) the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self-support-
ing and, if applicable, the period of time and training necessary therefore;
(5) reduced or lost lifetime earning capacity of the party seeking main-
tenance as a result of having foregone or delayed education, training, em-
ployment, or career opportunities during the marriage;
(6) the presence of children of the marriage in the respective homes of
the parties;
(7) the tax consequences to each party;
(8) contributions and services of the party seeking maintenance as a
spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career
potential of the other party;
(9) the wasteful dissipation of marital property by either spouse;
(10) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimo-
nial action without fair consideration; and
(11) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
Id. The New York legislature amended factors (3) and (4) and added factors (5) and (10)
in 1986. Act of Aug. 2, 1986, ch. 884, § 4, 1986 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2172, 2173-74 (McKin-
ney). See infra note 93 for a discussion of these amendments.
47 The statute states:
In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distri-
bution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where
the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession
would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution
shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the
parties.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(e) (McKinney 1986).
48 See Burrows's Memorandum, supra note 38, at 130. ("An important aspect of this
legislation is the flexibility which is incorporated due to the tremendous variation in
marital situations and the equities involved. Flexibility, rather than rigidity is essential
for the fair disposition of a given case.").
49 See, e.g., Kutanovski v. Kutanovski, 109 A.D.2d 822, 486 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1985),
1987]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
One such court reasoned that licenses or degrees did "not fall
within the traditional concepts of property" 50 because they repre-
sent an "intellectual achievement" 51 rather than a transferable ob-
ject with an exchange value. Courts further reasoned that enhanced
future earnings are only an expectancy and that some professionals
may not achieve increased earnings as a result of their licenses. 52
II
O'BRIEN V. O'BRIEN
A. The Facts of the Case
The O'Briens married in 1971, at which time Dr. O'Brien had
completed three and one-half years of college. Dr. O'Brien contin-
ued his education following marriage by attending night school to
complete his bachelor's degree and the required pre-medical
courses. 53 Mrs. O'Brien had a bachelor's degree and a temporary
teaching certificate at the time of marriage, but needed eighteen
months of graduate school to obtain permanent teaching certifica-
tion in New York.54
In September of 1973, the O'Briens moved to Guadalajara,
vacated in light of O'Brien, 120 A.D.2d 571, 502 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1986) (husband's medical
license not marital property); Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1983)
(husband's M.B.A. and M.P.A. degrees not marital property); Lesman v. Lesman, 88
A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982) (husband's medical license not marital property
because future earning capacity represents no more than an expectancy, dependent on
husband's future efforts).
50 Lesman, 88 A.D.2d at 157, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
51 Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77
(1978)). Courts often cite the portion of Graham quoted in Lesman as embodying the
most persuasive argument against characterizing a professional degree as marital prop-
erty. See, e.g., Stevens v. Stevens, 23 Ohio St. 3d 115, 117-18, 492 N.E.2d 131, 133
(1986); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979); Lehmicke v. Lehmicke,
339 Pa. Super. 559, 563,489 A.2d 782, 784 (1985); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 54,
296 N.W.2d 761, 766 (1980); Grosskopfv. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984).
The Graham court stated that a professional degree
does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable value on
an open market. It is personal to the holder. It terminates on death of
the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred,
conveyed, or pledged. An advanced degree is a cumulative product of
many years of previous education, combined with diligence and hard
work. It may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is
simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in the future
acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes of
property in the usual sense of that term.
Graham, 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77.
52 Graham, 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77.
53 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 713-14, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45.
54 The trial court found that Mrs. O'Brien had "relinquished this opportunity so
that the.., husband could obtain his educational goals." O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc.
2d 233, 234, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (1982), rev'd, 106 A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548,
rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1985).
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Mexico so that Dr. O'Brien could enroll in medical school.5 5 As a
result, Mrs. O'Brien sacrificed her opportunity to receive permanent
teaching certification in New York. 56 In Mexico, Mrs. O'Brien took
several teaching and tutorial positions and earned approximately
seventy-six percent of the couple's total income.57
The couple moved back to New York in December, 1976 so that
Dr. O'Brien could complete his medical training.58 Mrs. O'Brien
returned to her former teaching position. 59 Dr. O'Brien filed for
divorce in December of 1980, two months after he received his med-
ical license. 60 At trial, Mrs. O'Brien sought an equitable distribution
of the couple's marital property. 6 1
B. Lower Court Proceedings
The trial court held that Dr. O'Brien's education and degree
constituted a property right subject to equitable distribution. 62
During the trial, Mrs. O'Brien presented expert testimony that the
value of Dr. O'Brien's medical license was $472,000.63 Mrs.
O'Brien's expert calculated this figure by subtracting the average
lifetime income of a college graduate from that of a general sur-
geon, Dr. O'Brien's field of medicine. 64 The court accepted this cal-
culation and awarded 65 Mrs. O'Brien forty percent of the present
value of the license-$188,800-payable in eleven annual
installments. 66
The Appellate Division reversed the trial court, holding that a
55 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
56 Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 713-14, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744-45.
57 Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The O'Briens also received
contributions from both spouses' parent. Mr. O'Brien also contributed earnings and the
proceeds from educational loans. Id. at 581-82, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
58 Id. at 581-82, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 581, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
61 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d at 234, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
62 Id. at 241, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
63 Id. at 241, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06.
64 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 582, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745. The expert
also accounted for federal income taxes, a real interest rate of three percent, and an
inflation rate of ten percent. Id.
65 A distributive award is an award of money to one spouse that is used in lieu of
dividing other marital assets. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(1)(b) (McKinney 1986).
These awards may be in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed amounts, and are
not to be treated as ordinary income to the recipient under the United States Internal
Revenue Code. Id. Such awards give courts added flexibility when dividing property, or
when supplementing such divisions.
66 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d at 242,452 N.Y.S.2d at 806. Mrs. O'Brien also
was awarded expert witness and attorney's fees. Dr. O'Brien was ordered to obtain a life
insurance policy for her benefit as well. Id.
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professional license is not marital property67 because it does not fall
within the traditional concepts of property68 and because the legis-
lature had not intended to designate such licenses as property under
the Equitable Distribution Law. 69 The court further stated that an
enhanced earning capacity valuation 70 represented only "a specula-
tive and uncertain expectancy." 71 Judge Thompson's strong dissent
suggested that a professional license is marital property because a
license embodies a privilege to practice in a regulated profession
and thus is similar to a franchise right. 7 2 The Appellate Division
remitted the case so that the trial court could grant Mrs. O'Brien
maintenance and rehabilitative awards. 73 Mrs. O'Brien appealed,
and the case went to the Court of Appeals by leave of the Appellate
Division.74
C. The Court of Appeals' Decision
The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding
that Dr. O'Brien's medical license constituted marital property
under section 236(B) of the New York Domestic Relations Law. 75
The court reasoned that section 236(B)'s definition of marital prop-
erty was not tied to common law concepts of property. 76 Because
the statute controlled the definition of marital property, Dr.
O'Brien's principal argument that a professional license did not fall
within the traditional definition of property was irrelevant.77
The court focused on sections 236(B) (5) (d) (6),
236(B) (5) (d) (9),78 and 236(B)(5)(e), 79 stating that "[tihe words
mean exactly what they say: that an interest in a profession or pro-
fessional career potential is marital property which may be repre-
67 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 225-26, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550, rev'd, 66
N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
68 Id. at 227, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
69 Id. at 227-28, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 551-52.
70 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
71 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d at 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
72 Id. at 240, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 560 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
73 Id. at 231-32, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 554-55 (majority opinion).
74 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 580, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
75 Id. at 580-81, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744. The court remitted the
case to the Appellate Division to determine the factors the trial court considered in
granting the distributive award as required by N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(g) (Mc-
Kinney 1986). Id. at 589-90, 489 N.E.2d at 719-20, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
76 Id. at 583, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746 ("[T]he New York Legislature
deliberately went beyond traditional property concepts when it formulated the Equitable
Distribution Law.... [There is no common-law property interest remotely resembling
marital property.").
77 Id. at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
78 See supra note 9 for the text of § 236(B) (5) (d).
79 See supra note 47 for the text of § 236(B)(5)(e).
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sented by direct or indirect contributions of the non-title-holding
spouse."80 Subparagraph 6 specifically states that courts must con-
sider a spouse's contribution to the other's "career or career poten-
tial" when distributing marital assets.8 1 Subparagraph 9 implies
that an interest in a profession is an asset subject to distribution,8 2
and section 236(B)(5)(e) states that a court should use a distributive
award when dividing an interest in a profession would be contrary
to law.8 3 The court held that the statute mandated the conclusion
that a professional license acquired during marriage constitutes
marital property.8 4
The court also found that its conclusion corresponded to the
legislative policy behind the equitable distribution system of section
236(B).85 The legislature enacted this equitable distribution system
because the common-law title method had resulted in unfair distri-
butions.8 6 Under section 236(B), the division of property rests on
"all the circumstances of the case and the respective parties to the
marriage."8 7 Marriage is viewed as an economic partnership; after
its demise, courts should ensure that each partner receives a just
portion of the assets.88 The court concluded that "few undertakings
during a marriage better qualify as the type of joint effort that the
statute's economic partnership theory is intended to address than
contributions toward one spouse's acquisition of a professional
license."8 9
The court also upheld the present-value-of-future earnings
method of valuing the license,90 rejecting Dr. O'Brien's argument
that the court should award either rehabilitative maintenance or re-
imbursement for direct financial contributions, if it found that the
80 66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
81 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAv § 236(B)(5)(d)(6). For the complete text of this subsection,
see supra note 9.
82 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d)(9). For the complete text of this subsection,
see supra note 9.
83 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(e). For the complete text of this section, see
supra note 47.
84 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 715, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 746. The Court
noted that even outside the context of section 236(B), a professional license embodies a
property right. "A professional license is a valuable property right, reflected in the
money, effort and lost opportunity for employment expended in its acquisition, and also
in the enhanced earning capacity it affords its holder, which may not be revoked without
due process of law." Id. at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (citations
omitted).
85 Id. at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
86 Id. at 584-85, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747. See also supra notes 37-41
and accompanying text.
87 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
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license constituted marital property.91 The court found that a main-
tenance award would be inappropriate because maintenance is sub-
ject to termination if the recipient remarries; thus, the supporting
spouse might never receive an adequate return for her contribution
to the professional spouse's career.9 2 Because the license was a
marital asset, Mrs. O'Brien's share was independent of her marital
status. 93 The court also rejected reimbursement as the proper
method of valuing the license because this method neither ac-
counted for appreciation in the value of the license nor complied
with the statute's requirement that courts consider "contributions
and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker" in
making property distributions. 94
Although the court concluded that the trial court correctly val-
ued the license as the increased earning potential of the license
holder,9 5 it recognized the difficulty of fixing the present value of
the license. The court stated, however, that such problems were
"no more difficult than computing tort damages for wrongful death
or diminished earning capacity resulting from injury and they differ
only in degree from the problems presented when valuing a profes-
sional practice." 9 6
In his concurring opinion, Judge Meyer worried about the po-
tential burden the decision might place on some licensed spouses.97
He expressed concern that obligations created by a distributive
award, which is not modifiable under current law, 98 could force the
91 Id. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748 ("The statute does not ex-
pressly authorize retrospective maintenance or rehabilitative awards and we have no oc-
casion to decide in this case whether the authority to do so may ever be implied from its
provisions.").
92 Id.
93 Id. After O'Brien, the legislature amended section 236(B)(6) to favor a spouse
who contributes to her partner's education. When making maintenance awards, courts
may consider future earning capacities of both parties, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 236(B)(6)(a)(3) (McKinney 1986), and reduced earning capacity of a party resulting
from foregone career opportunities, id. § 236(B)(6)(a)(5). It also allows retrospective
maintenance. Id. § 236(B)(6). These changes make it more likely that self-supporting
spouses will receive maintenance awards that could adequately compensate them for
their efforts. These awards, however, still terminate upon remarriage, id. § 236(B)(6)(c),
and therefore do not provide adequate compensation when the supporting spouse re-
marries prior to receiving a fair share of the license.
94 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 587-88, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749 (quoting
§ 236(B)(5)(d)(6)).
95 For a discussion of the trial court's valuation analysis, see supra notes 64-65 and
accompanying text.
96 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
97 Id. at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J., concurring).
98 The Domestic Relations Law describes a distributive award as being "payable
either in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed amounts." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 236(B)(1)(b) (McKinney 1986). This language precludes the possibility of modifying a
distributive award. Further, the section of the Domestic Relations Law which deals spe-
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licensed spouse to choose an undesired field of practice.99 He sug-
gested that the legislature change the law to allow courts to modify
distributive awards if the professional spouse enters a field other
than that used to determine the original award. 100
To deter abuse of this provision, Judge Meyer proposed that if
the licensed spouse's claim later proved false, the supporting spouse
could seek reinstatement of the original award plus attorney's
fees.101
III
O'BRIEN AND ITS LIMITS
A. The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that Professional
Licenses Are Marital Property
The Court of Appeals correctly held that a professional license
earned during marriage constitutes marital property. The decision,
however, may have limited effects. Section 236(B)(5)(d)(6) of the
Domestic Relations Law specifically requires courts to consider con-
tributions to a spouse's career or career potential when dividing
marital property.'0 2 Sections 236(B)(5)(d)(9) and 236(B)(5)(e) im-
ply that an interest in a profession is marital property.103 The stat-
ute also states that courts must grant distributive awards when it
would be "impractical or burdensome or . . . contrary to law" to
divide an interest in a profession.' 0 4
Even without the statutory language, the court reached the
proper conclusion. To compensate Mrs. O'Brien fairly, the court
had to grant a distributive award of the property right embodied in
the medical license because Mrs. O'Brien had invested in her hus-
band's future105 and had made a number of sacrifices on his be-
half.' 06 Allowing Dr. O'Brien to receive almost all of the benefits
flowing from the license would have been unjust. Because the
O'Briens had few tangible marital assets, 10 7 a determination that the
license did not constitute marital property would have restricted
cifically with the modification of court awards, speaks only of maintenance and child
support awards. Id. § 236(B)(9)(b).
99 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J.,
concurring).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 592, 489 N.E.2d at 720-21, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52.
102 See supra note 9 for the text of § 236(B) (5) (d) (6).
103 See supra note 9 for the text of § 236(B)(5)(d)(9). For the text of § 236(B)(5)(e),
see supra note 47.
104 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw § 236(B)(5)(e). For the text of this section, see supra note
47.
105 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
106 Id.
107 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 234, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (1982), re,'d,
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Mrs. O'Brien's compensation solely to a maintenance award. Be-
cause maintenance awards terminate upon remarriage, Mrs.
O'Brien would only realize her expected return on the investment in
her husband's medical degree if she remained single. Such a result
is unacceptable. Supporting spouses such as Mrs. O'Brien should
receive a fair share of the family's joint efforts regardless of marital
status or need.
B. O'Brien's Limits
1. O'Brien is Limited to Professional Licenses
Although the trial court asserted that both Dr. O'Brien's medi-
cal license and his "education and degree" constituted marital prop-
erty under section 236(B),' 08 the Court of Appeals characterized
only the professional license as marital property. 10 9 The issue re-
mains whether the Court of Appeals' holding in O'Brien also applies
to either nonprofessional graduate degrees or undergraduate
degrees.
Certain relevant distinctions exist between professional licenses
and educational degrees that may justify limiting O'Brien to profes-
sional licenses. For example, in Cronin v. Cronin,110 decided in light
of O'Brien, the court held that only the wife's law degree earned dur-
ing the marriage, and not the husband's bachelor's degree, consti-
tuted marital property under section 236(B). The court stated that
"[t]he holding in O'Brien was . . . limited to professional licenses.
The Court of Appeals [in O'Brien] did not overrule prior court rul-
ings that educational degrees are not subject to equitable distribu-
tion.""' The court reasoned that material differences exist between
educational degrees, which realistically are not "'reified marital
property,' "1112 and professional licenses, which " 'in the nature of a
franchise' " translate an education into a right to practice in a regu-
lated field. 13
O'Brien, however, should apply to all educational degrees. First,
all of the economic and equitable arguments that persuaded the
Court of Appeals in O'Brien apply with equal force to nonprofes-
106 A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d
743 (1985).
108 Id. at 241, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
109 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 590, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
110 131 Misc. 2d 879, 502 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1986).
1I Id. at 882, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
112 Id. (quoting Connor v. Connor, 97 A.D.2d 88, 102, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 492
(1983)).
113 Id. at 883, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (quoting O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223,
240, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 560 (Thompson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
rev'd, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985)).
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sional educational degrees.' 14 For example, a spouse may make sac-
rifices and forego opportunities to allow the other spouse to pursue
a nonprofessional education. Second, the supporting spouse may
expect rewards to result from his or her investment in the nonpro-
fessional degree. Third, section 236(B) requires courts to consider
all contributions by one spouse to the other's career or career po-
tential in dividing marital property" 15 and in determining mainte-
nance. 116 This section does not distinguish between contributions
to professional careers and nonprofessional careers.
One New York court recognized the inequity of limiting the
O'Brien doctrine to professional licenses. In McGowan v. Mc-
Gowan, 117 the trial court held that a spouse's master's degree was a
marital asset subject to equitable distribution. The court stated that
"at least certain degrees may, as a practical matter, enhance the
earning capacity of the holder." 118 The court relied on sections
236(B)(5)(d)(6) and 236(B)(5)(d)(9), stating that the legislature in-
tended courts to consider contributions by one spouse to the other's
career. 119 The court concluded that the degree was the product of
the parties' joint efforts and should be considered marital
property. 120
Although conceptual distinctions exist between licenses and de-
grees, these distinctions should not outweigh equitable considera-
tions. Thus, New York courts should follow the McGowan
precedent because it comports with the reasoning behind O'Brien
and the legislative intent of section 236(B). 121 Otherwise, a sup-
porting spouse could recover his or her investment in a nonprofes-
sional degree only if the couple has existing marital assets to
adequately cover the investment.
114 See supra notes 25 & 86-89 and accompanying text. See also L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE
DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 182 n.192 (1983) ("[I]n theory, the arguments [for finding a
professional education to be marital property) are equally applicable to other types of
education. It would be hard to justify a rule of law which only applied to certain educa-
tional degrees."); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 106 A.D.2d 223, 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 ("It
would defy all law, logic and reason to declare ... that a college degree is not marital
property, and to now hold ... that a professional license is marital property."), rev'd, 66
N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1985).
115 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(d). See supra note 9 for the text of this section.
116 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(6). See supra note 46 for the factors a court should
consider in providing a maintanance award.
117 136 Misc. 2d 225, 518 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1987).
118 Id. at 229-30, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 349.
119 Id. at 230, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 349-50.
120 Id. at 229-30, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 349-50.
121 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 practice commentary, at 205 (McKinney 1986)
(suggesting that O'Brien applies whenever educational degree has economic value).
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2. O'Brien's Valuation Method Applies Only to Unestablished
Professional Practices
The court's method of valuing the professional degree further
limits O'Brien.122 Although this method is proper where the licensed
spouse has not yet established a practice, it may be inappropriate in
other cases. The O'Brien court recognized that the proper valuation
method may differ depending upon whether the licensed spouse has
begun to practice. 123 In O'Brien, the court used the average earnings
in Dr. O'Brien's field of medicine to estimate his future earnings
because he had not yet established a practice. 124 After a profes-
sional establishes a practice, however, a court can determine future
earnings more accurately and can grant a more appropriate award
to the supporting spouse by using the professional spouse's earn-
ings history as a guide. 125
In Vanasco v. Vanasco, 126 the husband, an accountant, had an es-
tablished practice. The court held that the value of the husband's
accounting license had "merged" with his practice and that the wife
was entitled to receive only a share of that practice.' 27 The court
stated that the husband had "already established a track record as
an accountant-good, bad, or otherwise-which is far more practi-
cal, and less speculative, to measure and gauge. The value of the
license, if any, is subsumed in the 'value' of the practice so that any
residual value of the license is de minimis."1 28
122 For a discussion of the O'Brien court's method of valuation, see supra notes 90-96
and accompanying text.
123 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 586, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748. Cf Vanasco
v. Vanasco, 132 Misc. 2d 227, 229, 503 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (1986) ("the license itself
becomes somewhat less significant where it appears to have merged in the business and
the danger arises wherein ... [the] plaintiff may, in effect, be seeking 'two bites of the
same apple' "). See also N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 practice commentary, at 203 (McKin-
ney 1986) (to permit spouse to receive share of practice and license would amount to
"double recovery").
124 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 582, 489 N.E.2d at 714, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 745.
125 Courts must use care when the educated spouse has a fledgling practice that has
yet to mature economically. The practice commentary to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236
suggests that when a practice has not reached its full economic potential the court
should still consider the license's value, or allow the supporting spouse to elect to take
the award based on the license or the practice. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 236 practice
commentary, at 203-04 (McKinney 1986).
126 132 Misc. 2d 227, 503 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1986).
127 Id. at 229-30, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 482 ("[T]he court concludes that marital property
encompasses a license to practice accounting ... but that the value of said license may,
as in the case at bar, merge into the business conducted through said license so that an
evaluation of said business, rather than the license is a truer measure of the value of said
property.").
128 Id. at 230, 503 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
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IV
O'BRIEN: ITS PROBLEMS AND A PROPOSAL
Although O'Brien correctly interprets section 236(B), the deci-
sion poses questions and presents problems. Part A of this section
discusses O'Brien's valuation method and proposes that courts con-
sider additional factors in valuing a license. It further suggests that
courts allow different valuation methods in different factual circum-
stances. Part B discusses the issue of modification of the property
award that Judge Meyer raised in his concurring opinion.
A. The Valuation of a Professional License
The Court of Appeals valued Dr. O'Brien's license based on the
present value of the enhanced earnings it would likely create. This
valuation method comports with that used by most economists who
base the value of an asset on its future or potential earnings rather
than on the cost of the asset. 129 The main advantage of the present-
value-of-enhanced-earnings method over the cost method is that
"value is essentially a prospective concept, based upon the earning,
or potential earning power, that an entity possesses. Thus, any eval-
uation which fails to include a reasonable determination of an en-
tity's capacity to draw a prospective stream of income may not, in
fact, be a true evaluation at all."' 130 For this reason, the present-
value-of-enhanced-future-earnings method compensates a support-
ing spouse more accurately than either a reimbursement 13 1 or an
opportunity cost award. 132
Although the Court of Appeals used the present value method
in O'Brien, other valuation methods may be appropriate in other cir-
cumstances. 133 Section 236(B) is a flexible statute, and courts
should use different formulae in different factual circumstances. In
particular, a court should use the reimbursement or opportunity
cost method when it is uncertain that the professional license or de-
gree will increase the license-holder's income perceptibly and the
supporting spouse made a significant sacrifice. For example, a pro-
129 Parkman, supra note 27, at 442; Comment, supra note 25, at 604; see also Kraus-
kopf, supra note 25, at 381-84 (discussing ways to measure return on investment in
education).
130 Comment, supra note 25, at 604.
131 For a discussion of reimbursement awards, see supra text accompanying notes
29-30.
132 For a discussion of opportunity cost awards, see supra note 31 and accompanying
text. Both reimbursement and opportunity cost awards only compensate a supporting
spouse for that spouse's costs.
133 See Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 214, 343 N.W.2d 796, 803 (1984)
("[Nbo mathematical formula or theory of valuation settles the case. Each must be de-
cided on its own facts .-. . [F]lexibility will maximize the fairness achieved in each
case.").
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fessionally educated spouse whose future earnings are uncertain
may nevertheless receive intangible benefits from his education. 34
Courts should take these intangible benefits into account when de-
termining the value of an education.
The O'Brien court's use of the present value method to value Dr.
O'Brien's medical license also presents an analytical dilemma. The
court described the value of the license as "the enhanced earning
capacity it affords the holder."' a35 The court did not discuss any fac-
tor other than the license that enhances a surgeon's earnings. It
thus apparently assumed that a surgeon's greater than average in-
come flows solely from the surgeon's professional license. Several
other factors, however, may in fact increase a surgeon's income.1 36
For example, a surgeon may work longer hours, experience more
pressure, or accept more responsibility than the average college
graduate does in his job.
If a professional's higher wages are partly attributable to other
factors related to his or her position, rather than solely to the pro-
fessional license, a court must alter its award accordingly. That part
of the professional's income not flowing from the license does not
represent marital property, but rather a reward for efforts outside
the marriage. 137 Although courts may have difficulty quantifying
such intangible factors, they should nevertheless consider the pro-
fessional's lifestyle and working conditions when calculating the en-
hanced earning capacity resulting from the license.
B. Modification of the Property Award
Courts cannot presently modify distributive awards.' 3 8 Judge
Meyer pointed out that prior to training in surgery, Dr. O'Brien had
completed one year of a residency in internal medicine and was con-
134 The education could still have value to the educated spouse, although not quan-
tifiable in economic terms. For instance, the education may lead to greater personal
fulfillment, to greater job security, or to greater prestige.
135 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 588, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
136 One author suggests that a court should consider the affect of increased skill and
experience of the licensed spouse. Accordingly, early in the spouse's career his or her
increased income results mostly from education. Later in the professional's career, his
or her income results mostly from experience rather than the knowledge acquired dur-
ing professional's education. Comment, supra note 25, at 609-10.
137 An example of this phenomenon is a truck driver who makes long drives. He or
she is paid in part for driving expertise, embodied in most states in a special driver's
license. The driver is also paid because the job requires driving long hours at all times
of the day and night. The driver often must sleep in the truck, and may be away from his
or her family for days at a time. Certainly the driver is paid, in part, for the various
lifestyle sacrifices that the job requires.
138 See supra note 98.
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sidering returning to that specialty.' 39 Nevertheless, the trial court
based its award on the average surgeon's earnings. 140 By not al-
lowing modification, the legislature prevents some licensed spouses
from altering their career paths before they have even settled in
their chosen field of practice. Limiting a spouse's future career
choices in such a manner is unfair. 141
Further, courts base awards on the assumption that the licensed
spouse will continue to earn an income from his profession. If
events occur that render this assumption false, courts may create
hardship to the licensed spouse by requiring continued payments
based on that assumption. For example, if a surgeon becomes un-
able to practice because he loses an arm, his income would drop
considerably. It then would be unfair to force the surgeon to con-
tinue to pay an award based on an obviously incorrect projection of
future income.' 42 The spouse may also enter an economically de-
pressed profession, resulting in lower than expected income or an
inability to find employment at all. Or, the spouse may simply fail to
attain average earnings in the chosen profession; or the spouse may
choose a lower-paying specialization in the profession (such as a
lawyer working as a public defender); or the state may disqualify the
spouse from practicing in the profession.
In addition, because section 236(B) does not permit modifica-
tion of property awards, the original award to the supporting spouse
may not reflect the true value of the enhanced future earnings.
Many courts believe that enhanced future earnings are merely an
expectancy, 143 and some judges might discount the awards to reflect
the uncertainty of the increased earnings. Allowing modification of
awards would eliminate this concern and could result in more accu-
rate valuations of the supporting spouse's share of the license.
To ameliorate these problems, the legislature should provide
for modification of distributive awards in which a supporting spouse
receives a share of a professional license. Courts should modify a
distributive award of a newly-received professional license only
when either spouse proves: 1) a change of specialization by the
139 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J.,
concurring).
140 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 241,452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (1982), rev'd,
106 A.D.2d 223, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548, rev'd, 66 N.Y.S.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498
N.Y.S.2d 243 (1985).
141 See O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 591, 489 N.E.2d at 720, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (Meyer, J.,
concurring) ("[Elquitable distribution was not intended to permit a judge to make a
career decision for a licensed, spouse still in training.").
142 For a discussion of factors which may affect a professional's earning capacity, see
Mullenix, supra note 25, at 271-72; Comment, supra note 25, at 611.
143 See, e.g., Todd v.Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 135 (1969);
Lesman v. Lesman, 88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
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professional spouse that will likely alter significantly the future earn-
ings of the licensed spouse; or 2) substantially different earnings
than the court had projected when it made the award.1 44 Allowing
courts to modify an award is better than forcing the licensed spouse
into bankruptcy.1 45 In addition, allowing courts to modify awards
adds a greater degree of flexibility to the payment process. For ex-
ample, payments could later be amortized over a longer or shorter
period of time if a court finds a temporary change in income.
Courts should not modify awards simply because the recipient's
marital status changes. The supporting spouse has earned a share
of the license and should receive this share regardless of need or
later remarriage. This is why the award should be a distributive,
rather than a maintenance, award. If maintenance did not end upon
remarriage of the recipient spouse, a maintenance award could be
fashioned using the O'Brien criteria. Further, because of administra-
tive concerns, modification should not be permitted if circumstances
change after the licensed spouse completes payment. To allow
otherwise would prevent a court from closing a case until the li-
censed spouse died.
This proposal does have some drawbacks. The major drawback
is the burden it would place on the judicial system if licensed
spouses went to court every time their income dropped. Another
problem is that a licensed spouse might falsify his income or use the
courts to harass the supporting spouse. To combat these problems,
the legislature could provide the supporting spouse with the right to
have the award reinstated and to receive attorney's fees "should the
purported circumstance on which a change is made turn out to have
been feigned or to be illusory."1 46
The way some courts are authorized to distribute nonvested
pension plans upon divorce supports the conclusion that the legisla-
144 To meet the "substantial" standard, the licensed spouse would have to prove
that because his or her earnings are considerably less than the court had projected, re-
quiring the licensed spouse to make the remaining payments would impose an inequita-
ble burden. The supporting spouse could receive an upward modification if he or she
were suffering a hardship and the educated spouse was earning more than predicted.
The latter scenario might occur if the economy suffered double-digit inflation for several
years.
145 Unlike maintenance, which is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5) (1982), a property settlement can be discharged. New York considers a dis-
tributive award a property settlement. See Note, Compensation for Financing a Spouse's Edu-
cation: The Means of EconomicJustice in Maine, 35 ME. L. REv. 341, 346-47 & n.22 (1983)
(authored by William Kany) (arguing for structuring awards for spouse's contribution to
educational degree as "gross alimony" because "maintaining the award in an alimony
form will retain one of the primary benefits of ordinary alimony-its nondischargability
in bankruptcy").
146 O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d at 592, 489 N.E.2d at 721, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (Meyer, J.,
concurring).
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ture should allow courts to modify property awards. When dividing
nonvested pensions plans, some courts may retain jurisdiction over
the divorce action if the likelihood that the pension will vest is so
uncertain that discerning the present value of the pension rights is
impossible.1 47 In such a situation, courts may award a percentage of
the pension payments as they accrue. This analogy demonstrates
that courts can retain jurisdiction over distribution awards without
overburdening the judicial system.
Although this proposal conflicts with the traditional notion that
property distributions are almost never modifiable,1 48 the profes-
sional license is not a traditional form of property. In the more fa-
miliar case of a distribution of a professional practice, the
professional spouse may be able to sell the practice if at some point
he can no longer work.' 49 The professional cannot, however, sell
his license, even if he can no longer use it to generate income. Fur-
ther, in the case of a professional practice, a court can estimate fu-
ture earnings based upon past earnings. 50 With a professional
license, however, the court must base its award upon a prediction of
the expected enhanced earnings that the license will produce rather
than an established pattern of earnings. These differences, as well
as the chance that the professional may not have taken a job within
his profession, suggest that a court should be able to modify its dis-
tributive award of a professional license where the licensed spouse
has not yet established a career.
147 In re Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 848, 544 P.2d 561, 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639
(1976) ("[I]f the court concludes that because of uncertainties affecting the vesting or
maturation of the pension that it should not attempt to divide the present value of the
pension rights, it can instead award each spouse an appropriate portion of each pension
payment as it is paid."). In discussing the need for the court to maintain jurisdiction in
these cases rather than to allow no award, the court noted that "the claim of mere ad-
ministrative burden surely cannot serve as support for an inequitable substartive rule."
Id. at 849, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639. See also Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61
N.Y.2d 481, 486, 463 N.E.2d 15, 17, 474 N.Y.S.2d 699, 701 (1984) (court "may provide
that upon maturity of the pension rights the recipient pay a portion of each payment
received to his or her former spouse").
148 New York does not provide for modification of property awards under any cir-
cumstances, see supra note 98 and accompanying text, Indiana allows modification only
in cases of fraud. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-17 (Burns Supp. 1986). See generally
Gold-Bikin, Modification of Matrimonial Determinations, in 4 FAMiLY LAW AND PRACTICE,
supra note 21, § 52.04, at 52-59 (property distributions modifiable only in cases of mis-
take, fraud, duress, or where additional property revealed after granting of award).
149 Cf Herring, supra note 25, at 15 (Noting in a discussion of workman's compensa-
tion awards that "if goodwill is valued at a certain sum, the business may be sold to pay
the award .... In making an award based on the future earnings of a degree holder,
there is no existing fund from which to pay the award.").
150 See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
By declaring that professional licenses are marital property, the
New York Court of Appeals in O'Bien took a major step toward pro-
tecting the rights of those who support their spouse through profes-
sional school. Although O'Bien is a relatively narrow decision that
applies only to professionals, its protection should extend to all
spouses who support their spouses through any form of higher
education.
Courts should be able to modify awards given to supporting
spouses if the licensed spouse can prove that he or she no longer
works in the field upon which the award was based or if the spouse
has a substantially lower income than the court had expected when
it calculated the award. When a court attempts to determine the
value of a professional license by calculating a spouse's earning po-
tential, it should consider all the factors that affect a professional's
income. A professional's income is often attributable to factors in
addition to the license; he or she should be entitled to keep that part
of his or her income attributable solely to the added demands of his
or her profession.
Scott E. Willoughby
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